Introduction
The counterinsurgency fought by the Government
of Sudan against the rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the
Nuba Mountains of central Sudan during the early 1990s was not only
exceptionally violent, but also aimed at depopulating the area of civilians.
Not only did the government aim to defeat the SPLA forces but they also
intended a wholesale transformation of Nuba society in such a way that its
prior identity was destroyed. The campaign was genocidal in intent and at one
point, appeared to be on the brink of success.
The war in the Nuba Mountains has a number of
obvious similarities to the war in Darfur of a decade later. It was fought
within the boundaries of northern Sudan. Local issues such as land ownership
intersected with central government security concerns, and the conflict took on
a distinct racial character. The war was notable for attacks on civilian
targets with forced displacement, rape and killing. The principal instruments
of counterinsurgency included locally-recruited militia, the regular army and
the air force, under the overall coordination of Military Intelligence.
However, there are also important differences. The Sudan Government succeeded
in keeping its military operations and population relocations in the Nuba
Mountains a secret for several years, and despite Sudan’s international
ostracism at the time, there was no outcry until the area was opened up to
international scrutiny by a joint BBC-Justice Africa mission in
1995.
1 (Subsequently, a number of international organizations
including Christian agencies became involved and gave the Nuba a high profile.)
The Nuba resistance did not have an international profile and there was no
international humanitarian operation. But perhaps the most important difference
between the Nuba in the early 1990s and Darfur today was that the Nuba
campaigns were mounted by a government at the height of its ideological fervor,
were explicitly
jihad-ist, and included an ambitious program of total
social transformation for Nuba society. Population displacement in the Nuba was
for essentialist reasons: it was pursued not just in pursuit of military
objectives but also to create a new Islamist persona. A decade later, the
government in Khartoum had become ideologically exhausted and its appeals to
jihad were the product of habit more than true commitment. The
population displacement in Darfur, proportionately just as massive as in the
Nuba, is primarily instrumental: it is for the army to win the war and reward
its militia allies with a land grab. If an argument for genocide is to be made,
the Nuba during 1990-93 have a much less ambiguous case than Darfur in
2003-04.
The focus of this essay is how the violence in
the Nuba Mountains came to an end. A ceasefire was negotiated between the Sudan
Government and the SPLA in Burgenstock, Switzerland, in January 2002 in the
first stages of the efforts to find a peace settlement to the long-running war
between the central government and the SPLA. The ceasefire held, supervised by
just two dozen unarmed ceasefire monitors, and the Nuba Mountains won special
autonomous status in the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This is
important, and ultimately provides the chance for the Nuba to escape its
historic vulnerability to marginalization and group-targeted violence. But the
specifically genocidal aspect to the violence had been reduced ten years
earlier, to the extent that after 1993, the survival of the Nuba as a distinct
people living in their own historic territory was not in doubt. The war after
1993 up to the 2002 ceasefire witnessed further burnings, killings, hunger and
other atrocities, which were a subject of grave concern, but the genocidal
force of the government campaign had gone. The main concern of this essay is
the scaling-back of the government’s ambitions in the Nuba Mountains in 1993.
Why did the genocidal onslaught on the Nuba end, only to be replaced by a
lower-intensity ongoing counterinsurgency?
Background of the Nuba War
The Nuba Mountains lie in South Kordofan, a
province (now a state) in the geographical centre of Sudan, chiefly inhabited
by a cluster of peoples indigenous to the area. They are “black” and “African”,
followers of Islam, Christianity and traditional religions, but their homeland
is within the political boundaries of northern Sudan. They share South Kordofan
with Arab cattle pastoralists, chiefly the Hawazma and Missiriya. Their skill
at music, dancing, wrestling and body art has been celebrated by ethnographers
and cultural tourists—but by the same token regarded as embarrassingly
“primitive” by northern Sudanese elites, who are often candid about their
“civilisation mission” to extend Arab-Muslim culture to the peripheries of
their huge and diverse country. Long regarded as second-class citizens by the
dominant classes of Sudan, the Nuba were discriminated against in the provision
of education and development, and in the 1970s and ‘80s were also the victims
of systematic land seizure. In the mid-1980s, many Nuba joined the Southern-led
SPLA, and in 1985 fighting began. It escalated in 1987 when the SPLA despatched
the “New Kush” division to the area.
The early period of the war was marked by
militia massacres and extra-judicial executions by military intelligence. In a
mixture of reprisals and counter-insurgency, some of it pre-emptive, a
coalition of military officers and local militia commanders escalated violence
against the Nuba. The first step was the arming of local Arab tribes by the
government, initially as a panicked response to an SPLA attack in the region in
1985, and in 1989 they were formalized into the “Popular Defence Forces.” The
militias committed the worst massacres of the war, driven not only by orders
from their paramilitary command, but also by their own search for cattle, loot
and cheap labor.
The June 1989 Islamist coup brought a very
brief period of respite to the Nuba, followed rapidly by an escalation of
violence. In October 1991, the government sealed off South Kordofan,
prohibiting travel by foreigners. This was the first step in an unprecedented
military assault, accompanied by a radical plan for population relocation. The
idea of planned displacement and the concept of “peace camps” for the relocated
had existed for several years, but this was the first time that the government
was envisaging its use throughout an entire region. In addition, mass rape
appeared as an instrument of policy. The intent was to wholly clear the Nuba
Mountains of Nuba people. The campaign was justified by explicit reference to
jihad.
Death squads targeted community leaders in
rural areas, while intellectuals in the towns were rounded up by Military
Intelligence and “disappeared.” The rationale was explained by Khalid Abdel
Karim al Husseini, formerly head of the security in the Office of the Governor
of Kordofan (and younger brother of the governor), until he left Sudan and
sought asylum in Europe in 1993.
2 He said that the government was
“taking the intellectuals, taking the professionals, to ensure that the Nuba
were so primitive that they couldn’t speak for themselves.”
The resettlement of the Nuba out of the
mountains was what marked the jihad as being more than another
military offensive. The government announced plans for the resettlement of
500,000 people, the entire population of the insurgent area, and by late 1992
had relocated one third of that number, many of them outside South Kordofan.
Had this program proceeded, the Nuba Mountains themselves would have been
denuded of their inhabitants.
Rape was ubiquitous in the campaign. This was
not just soldiers’ license. There was an official policy of segregating men and
women in the “peace camps.” Khalid el Husseini explained: “the reason for the
men and women being distributed in different camps is to prevent them marrying,
the reason being that if the men and women are together and get married and
have children, that itself is contrary to government policy….The members of the
Arab tribes are allowed to marry them in order to eliminate the Nuba
identity.”
3 The phrase “allowed to marry” amounts to “encouraged to
rape” in the context of the absolute power held by the camp officials and
guards over the females in their charge.
Government forces followed a policy of famine.
They disrupted trade and closed markets, destroyed farms and looted animals.
Raiding, abduction and rape prevented any movement between villages and to
markets. Thousands died of hunger and disease, while the flow of basic goods
(including soap, salt and clothing) to the rebel areas almost completely dried
up. The Nuba Mountains went back in time: people wore home-spun cotton or went
naked, could no longer use currency and so instead reverted to barter, and
relied upon traditional medical remedies.
The policy was genocidal in both intent and
possible outcome. Why did it not succeed? There were three reasons: the limits
of the jihad-ist project, the resistance of the SPLA, and the
opposition of bystanders.
The Jihad-ist Project and its Limits
The project of jihad failed in
significant part because of its internal contradictions. It failed to obtain a
political consensus across Sudan’s ruling elite. Its military and political
weaknesses became exposed as its architects sought to implement it. A narrative
of the attempted genocide is complex, because there was no single centrally
directed conspiracy, but rather an interplay between ideology, greed, war
strategy, political competition and personal ambition.
The origins of the genocidal project lay in
the vision of the total social transformation of Sudan into an Islamic state,
under the guidance of the National Islamic Front. This involved “curing” what
were identified as social ills and pathologies, including the allegedly
“un-Islamic” practices of groups such as the Nuba, and creating a new Muslim
“persona.” The language of “healing” was explicit here and elsewhere in
Sudan.
4 Given that large sections of the Sudanese citizenry,
including many Nuba, were in armed revolt against this socio-cultural project
(as well as its accompanied political oppression and economic exploitation),
this led to a merger between social transformation and counter-insurgency. In
turn this logically led to a project of destroying those groups who resisted,
either by physically eliminating their members, or by eradicating their
cultures and assimilating the survivors. Along with forcible resettlement in
what were named, with Orwellian aptness, “peace camps,” this entailed a policy
of rape, as a measure intended both to destroy the fabric of the targeted
communities and to create a new generation with “Arab” paternity. This agenda
was justified by reference to the SPLA insurgency that was already in process,
and neatly converged with the economic enticements of expropriating farmland
and transforming its erstwhile owners into a servile agricultural proletariat.
It was a deformed moral project.
A group of militant Islamists and security
officers sought to carry out the project. They garnered the endorsement of the
highest level of the state apparatus for the concept of a
jihad, and
mobilized very considerable resources, including aircraft and foreign military
advisers. However, while they were fighting their
jihad, they were
also engaged in an internal power struggle with others within the government
and army who wished to pursue a less radical approach, including some who (even
at that date) sought a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. The radical
Islamists’ problems were compounded by the weakness of their social analysis of
the region. Their historically and sociologically simplistic view of the
conflict and the ethnic factor horrified their compatriots, including fellow
political leaders and military officers, who were more familiar with the
complex ethnic and political realities. This sociological naiveté was an
inevitable result of the beguiling simplicities of Islamist theory. It meant
that the commanders of the genocide trusted in quick success, but in fact were
unable to sustain the political consensus over the longer period of time
required to complete their project.
5
The concept of
jihad was developed in
the Arab and Islamic Bureau, a quasi-official entity chaired by the Islamists’
leader, Hassan al Turabi. The Bureau was responsible both for the international
policy of the Islamists, for example offering hospitality to Usama bin Laden
and other international militants, and also for key components of domestic
policy. Turabi served as supervisor of the Bureau, claiming credit for its
successes and disavowing its failures. A number of very senior Sudanese
Islamist militants were responsible for its domestic activities.
6
The Bureau instructed the Vice President, General Zubeir Mohamed Saleh, to
conduct the Kordofan
jihad. It organized support to the military
campaign in the form of international
mujahidiin, who helped train the
local militia, and instructed the religious leaders of Kordofan to issue
a
fatwa in its support.
A series of meetings was held in the regional
capital, el Obeid, in March and April 1992. In the first conference, local Arab
leaders were mobilized as
mujahidiin and given titles, weapons and
vehicles. This took the militia policy to a new level of legitimacy and
mobilization. They clearly understood that non-cooperation would have its
price. General Zubeir presided over the meeting and personally directed the
major military assault that followed, named
Bishayir al Kheirat
(“Expectation of Blessing”).
8 President Bashir attended the final rally,
taking the title
imam al jihad and bestowing lesser
jihad-ist
titles on the tribal leaders. Shortly afterwards, six
ulama (Muslim
clerics) issued a
fatwa in support of the campaign. Its most notable
clause was one that excommunicated the rebels, on the grounds that fighting the
Sudan Government was equivalent to rebellion against Islam:
The rebels in South Kordofan and Southern
Sudan started their rebellion against the state and declared war against the
Muslims. Their main aims are: killing the Muslims, desecrating mosques, burning
and defiling the Qur’an, and raping Muslim women. In so doing, they are
encouraged by the enemies of Islam and Moslems: these foes are the Zionists,
the Christians and the arrogant people who provide them with provisions and
arms. Therefore, an insurgent who was previously a Muslim is now an apostate;
and a non-Muslim is a non-believer standing as a bulwark against the spread of
Islam, and Islam has granted the freedom of killing both of them according to
the following words of Allah…
9
This is a disturbing document. One of its
clearest sequelae was that government troops destroyed mosques in the
SPLA-controlled areas. The
fatwa has been interpreted by some writers
as a universal charter for
jihad and as nothing less than a precursor
of Usama bin Laden’s declarations of war.
10 Closer scrutiny suggests
otherwise. When el Husseini initially called the senior
imams and
sheikhs of Kordofan for a meeting and demanded that they issue a
fatwa, the region’s most senior cleric, Sheikh Abdel Rahim al Bura’i
of el Obeid, refused. Other
ulama joined him in pointing out that many
Nuba are Muslims and cannot be the target of a
jihad. The Governor
instructed another government cleric in the regional capital, Sheikh Mushawar
Juma Sahal, to write the
fatwa. At first he also refused, but later
on, certainly under serious pressure and possibly with inducements offered,
accepted the task. Sheikh Sahal and the government
mufti of Kordofan,
Sheikh Musa Abdel Majid, were the only senior persons to sign the
fatwa. All the others were second-rate provincial
ulama.
11 It was an embarrassingly amateur attempt at
Islamic theology, and was made public only after the President had left el
Obeid.
More seriously, the fatwa failed to
obtain the public endorsement of the Islamists’ leader, Dr. Hassan al Turabi,
who was abroad at the time, and who studiously avoided publicly invoking
jihad. Most probably, Turabi wanted to back both sides. His own Arab
and Islamic Bureau had initially called for jihad. Now, he was waiting
on the sidelines to see if the jihad would succeed or not. Had it done so, he
would have claimed the victory for himself, and embraced his acolytes who had
planned it.
The Kordofan jihad is most closely
associated with the Governor of Kordofan, the newly-promoted Lt.-Gen. Sayed
Abdel Karim el Husseini, and his notably zealous Commissioner for South
Kordofan, Abdel Wahab Abdel Rahman Ali. They were assisted by many others, such
as the head of Military Intelligence in Kadugli, Major Ahmed Khamis. Their
motivations were mixed. El Husseini did not have a record as an Islamist. He
was a career military officer who seized the openings offered by the Islamist
government, and who opportunistically tried to prove both his loyalty and his
new-found Islamist credentials during the campaign. Abdel Wahab Abdel Rahman
was a more typical middle ranking civilian Islamist cadre with a background in
Islamist social mobilization. The most ideological of the three, he lacked rank
in the Islamist hierarchy: he too was trying to prove his credentials. Major
Ahmed Khamis was a military officer who had acquired a reputation for unusual
cruelty since been promoted to his post in 1987. He personally figures in the
testimonies of almost all Nuba who were imprisoned in Kadugli between 1985 and
1995, holding the power of life and death over those in his charge. His career
illustrates how those with a penchant for decisive and unflinching violence can
thrive during a protracted counter-insurgency war.
The military campaign was designed in Khartoum
and Vice President Zubeir directed the major assault personally. It was the
largest offensive of the war, but it suffered weaknesses in planning. The most
serious of these was an underestimation of the tenacity and skill of the SPLA
forces. Ideologues are often let down by their neglect of practicalities, and
especially tend to overlook the need for contingency planning when things go
awry. The planners also paid little heed to the gap between the moral purity of
the ideal
jihad and the tawdry realities of counter-insurgency.
Theoreticians of
jihad such as Sayed Qutb stress that the moral fervor
of the
mujahid is essential to secure victory, and that dying in the
path of
jihad is the most noble death for a Muslim and a sure path to
paradise.
12 Qutbist theory insists that victory is solely in the
hands of God, who will deliver it based on the faith of the
mujahidiin. Although he may use all practical military means
available, the true
mujahid is thereby encouraged into a spirit of
self-sacrifice that may, in purely military terms, be wholly futile. The
Nuba
jihad contains many examples of the triumph of faith over
caution, for example the propensity of the
mujahidiin commanders to
alert the SPLA troops of imminent attacks by insisting that their troops cry
“Allahu akbar!” as they leapt out of their trenches. Some of the foreign
mujahidiin reportedly refused to fight when they arrived at the front
and realised that many of the Nuba were Muslims.
Without a quick victory, the realities of
protracted war against a wily enemy drowned out the spirit of jihad.
The jihad-ist language was reduced to mere formula, cited by officers
in their reports for the benefit of superiors. There was neither heroism nor
combat in the service of God, just a dirty little war, involving dejected and
frightened soldiers killing poor and frightened villagers.
The government was united in support of the
1992 military offensive, but not the policy of relocation. Vice President
Zubeir appears to have opposed the relocations, and sought to undermine his
erstwhile protege, el Husseini. Just before the announcement of jihad,
Zubeir removed Abdel Wahab Abdel Rahman as Commissioner of South Kordofan (by
dint of “promoting” him to be regional minister of health—an ironic appointment
if ever there was one) and put in place a rival officer, Mohamed el Tayeb Fadl.
On his arrival in Kadugli, Mohamed el Tayeb found the town divided and
distrustful of the government. With Zubeir’s mandate, he negotiated a ceasefire
with the SPLA at a small town called Bilenya, and froze the relocations policy.
However, he was outmanoevered by el Husseini, who dispatched him on a
pilgrimage to Mecca. El Husseini went personally to Kadugli to start the
relocations program, and then brought back Abdel Wahab Abdel Rahman. The
ceasefire was rescinded (and many Nuba civilians who had taken the opportunity
to visit towns were detained and relocated to peace camps). Subsequently Abdel
Wahab was dismissed again, Mohamed el Tayeb briefly brought back and then
removed, and a new Commissioner appointed.
If Gen. Zubeir was opposed to the relocation
policy, why could he not remove el Husseini and definitively halt the genocidal
project? First, he was personally and publicly committed to the success of the
military offensive, which he had agreed to lead. Second, there were other
military imperatives—the SPLA launched big attacks on the southern capital Juba
in June and July 1992. Third and most important, the military officers who were
formally at the apex of the state were not in full control. Equal or greater
power was wielded by the militant Islamists in the Arab and Islamic Bureau, and
the government remained in place, provided the two groups were ready to
accommodate one another.
Divides reached right down to the provincial
level. Military intelligence in Kordofan, commanded by Ahmed Khamis, was
fervently in support of extreme measures, including eliminating large numbers
of educated Nuba.
14 A handful of Nuba chiefs were also ready to
collaborate, anticipating absolute power within their fiefdoms. For example,
Chief Kafi Tayara Bedin was an outspoken supporter of relocations, and ran a
private prison in collaboration with Ahmed Khamis. But the army relied on Nuba
soldiers and NCOs for many of its troops, and as stories of the excesses of the
jihad spread, there was an upsurge in discontent within the ranks. On
11 April 1992, 101 Nuba army officers and policemen were arrested, accused of
planning a “racial coup,” which in Sudanese political-speak means a mutiny by
ethnic minorities. Although the plot was suppressed, discontent remained a
serious problem. The Kadugli Security Committee also supported the ceasefire
and opposed the relocations, and conspired to weaken el Husseini and remove
Abdel Wahab.
El Husseini and his allies, meanwhile, could
probably have prevailed if their specific brand of jihad-ist practice
had enjoyed the unambiguous imprimatur of the Islamist leadership. If Turabi
had supported them directly, their extreme version of social planning might
have gone ahead. Turabi’s tactics are often inscrutable, and it was notable
that he decided to go on a foreign tour just as the power struggle over the
Kordofan jihad was at its peak. Perhaps Turabi was already aware of
the limits of his project for creating an Islamic state. Or perhaps he thought
that the time was not yet ripe.
The Nuba jihad resembles many
Sudanese counterinsurgencies, from the earliest days of the war in 1985 until
the Darfur offensives of 2003-04, in the identity of the architects, the use of
local militia, the scorched earth tactics, and the impunity enjoyed by military
officers in an ethics-free zone. It differs in the prominence given to Islamist
ideology. Driven by a radical and simplistic ideology that was unable to cope
with the demands of real politics, the jihad was always liable to
collapse under the stress of its internal contradictions. But could it be
sustained for long enough to achieve its goals nonetheless? It is at this
juncture that the resistance of the intended victims became key.
SPLA Resistance
The resistance of the SPLA was the second
major factor in halting the Nuba genocide. With their backs against the wall
and facing collective annihilation, the Nuba in rural areas supported the SPLA
resistance with remarkable unanimity and persistence. At the very nadir of
their struggle, the Nuba found new reserves of determination, and debated in a
consultative council whether to surrender or fight on. Not trusting the
government to keep any promises, they voted to continue to fight. Their
resilience bought time: by slowing down the advance of the government troops,
they ultimately defeated the genocide.
By 1992, the SPLA troops in the Nuba Mountains
were battle-hardened and knew their strength. When they confronted the
mujahidiin columns, they were confident, knowing the inexperience of
the latter. Nonetheless the attack on Tullishi Mountain was one of the most
sustained and ferocious battles of the entire war, with day-and-night
bombardment of the mountain, followed by massed infantry attacks. More than
40,000 troops were involved at the height of the campaign. Assaults continued
for four months, often day and night. They did not succeed. The defence of the
mountain, led by Alternate Commander Mohamed Juma with just 970 men, was one of
the most remarkable military feats of arms in the entire war, although because
of the remoteness of the area it was fully five years before it received any
recognition.
15 Juma’s small force beat off repeated attacks, despite
receiving no reinforcements during the entire battle (an attempt at re-supply
failed), and so had to provision itself from what it could capture. The terrain
helped the defenders, who hid in caves and used the escarpments as their
bulwarks. The Nuba fighters were highly motivated, defending their own homeland
with the encouragement of the local population. In May the Government finally
declared it had captured Tullishi mountain and withdrew. But the SPLA forces
were still in control.
We must now turn to an analysis of the Nuba
leadership and the social contract that it forged with the Nuba people. The
SPLA commander in the Nuba Mountains, Yousif Kuwa Mekki, played a remarkable
role in leading the resistance. A schoolteacher and cultural activist, Yousif
Kuwa helped mobilize the Nuba for political representation and then as part of
the SPLA.
16 Yousif Kuwa (who died in 2000) was close to his people,
full of enthusiasm for their culture, and ready to share their hardship and
suffering. His personal charisma and wide network of support among the Nuba was
pivotal in building the resistance in the mountains, and keeping the core of it
intact during the hardest years, when the SPLA was in retreat.
The bare facts of the Nuba resistance are
these. The defense of Tullishi mountain was probably the finest feat of arms of
the SPLA during the entire war. At that point, several SPLA attempts to
re-supply the Nuba Mountains were unsuccessful, due to attacks by the
government army, internecine conflict among the SPLA in the South, drought,
floods and the corruption of an SPLA officer en route. There was no
humanitarian presence in the region at all. There was no news coverage, and in
any case the people in the mountains had no batteries for their radios. The
Nuba felt forgotten by everyone. With nothing but themselves to rely on, they
found the necessary determination and reserves of energy. The critical moment
in this was a meeting called by Yousif Kuwa in September 1992. He formed an
“Advisory Council” of representatives from across the region, to discuss the
single question of whether to continue to fight or to surrender in order to
avoid the devastation of indefinite resistance. Yousif Kuwa opened the meeting
by recounting the history of the struggle up to that point, and concluded his
presentation with the remark that while he took responsibility for everything
that had happened so far, from now on the decision would be collective. There
was a long and vigorous debate—one of the commanders who argued for making a
deal, Telefon Kuku, later handed over his home town to the government forces
without a fight and was subsequently imprisoned by the SPLA
17—but the
meeting eventually voted to continue the struggle. It also made a number of
supplementary decisions concerning education, social services and religious
tolerance.
Normally an abstraction, the “social contract”
was made real by this encounter. It was a rare situation in which a political
leadership has to rely entirely on the willing support of its constituency for
its own survival. In this case, Yousif Kuwa recognized the challenge and
responded, and the Nuba were the beneficiaries of the outcome. Over the
following years, the Nuba guerrillas fought on with resourcefulness and
determination, while the civil administration opened schools and clinics. All
this was accomplished with no budget and no external assistance.
When international agencies began to operate
in the Nuba Mountains in 1995, they were at first impressed with the
self-reliance and pride of the people. Subsequently, the demoralization and
corruption so often associated with a philanthropic intervention in poor
communities arrived and began to spread. Christian missionary activities
provided material support and encouragement but some of the more radical
Christians also proved divisive. The military and political malaise within the
main command of the SPLA also spread to the Nuba commanders, who lost much of
their energy and cohesion, with some of them defecting to Khartoum and others
becoming more concerned with their personal wellbeing.
Bystanders
A supplementary reason for the defeat of the
genocidal project was wider opposition in Sudanese society. The leaders of the
Kordofan jihad tried to keep the real nature of their activities
secret. But, by relocating destitute and starving Nuba civilians to the
outskirts of northern Kordofan towns, the authorities brought their activities
to wider attention. Shocked by what they were witnessing, the citizens of these
towns began to bring food and medicine to the Nuba dumped on their doorstep.
They were still more shocked when the security forces stopped their charitable
activities. The groundswell of popular disgust, expressed through social
networks rather than openly, contributed to the retreat of the
militants.
In addition, the Islamic relief agencies and
the regional government were having difficulty coping with the sheer numbers of
relocated people. Their plans for absorbing the boys into Islamic schools were
simply too ambitious, and the food began to run out. As they were engaged in
constantly reassuring international donors that they could cope with Sudan’s
relief needs, the sudden crisis in Kordofan was an embarrassment. Many
humanitarian professionals staffing Sudan’s relief establishment were
personally appalled at what was happening. A comparison between this period and
the preceding “democratic” period is instructive. The free press and
competitive electoral system in place up to 1989 failed to protect the Nuba.
The mechanisms that provided modest assistance during this “liberal” period
were family and sectarian connections, plus the general humane concern of the
Sudanese general public, which were the very same mechanisms that came into
play under the dictatorship.
The diplomatic community in Khartoum and the
UN gave the Nuba some attention but with modest impact. The international
community was handicapped by its lack of reliable information, its lack of
influence in Khartoum (which was already a pariah state), and the timidity of
humanitarian agencies fearful of losing the government’s consent for their
relief programs elsewhere in the country. The mixed motives of relief agencies
and western diplomats were to be a constant hindrance to obtaining decisive
action on the Nuba Mountains throughout the 1990s. Every time speaking out on
the Nuba was suggested, the objection came that this would jeopardize
humanitarian access in the South. The humanitarians’ argument can be
paraphrased: why endanger a precarious but real relief operation serving needy
people in Southern Sudan for what might be merely symbolic action over the
Nuba? It was a real dilemma that cannot be lightly dismissed, but the suspicion
must be that, until there was a practical interest by a sufficient number of
international NGOs (in about 1997), the UN and major donors preferred
timidity.
One gesture during the
jihad period
was a mention of the Nuba Mountains by the head of the newly-established UN
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, on his visit to Khartoum in
September 1992. However, the UN in Khartoum at that point was in one of its
most acquiescent moods, and did precisely nothing. The second principal gesture
was a U.S. Congressional Resolution in October that mentioned the Nuba
Mountains in the context of condemning human rights abuses in Sudan (and
specifically the disappearance of two Sudanese USAID employees, who had been
murdered by the security forces in Juba). The latter served primarily as a
morale boost to the Sudanese opposition. This attention was spurred in part by
a newsletter from Africa Watch, written by this author, which was compiled from
evidence obtained through Kadugli and el Obeid.
18 At Africa Watch,
we also lobbied Eliasson directly and drafted the Congressional resolution. In
1993, two British MPs, Tony Worthington and Robert Banks, visited Kadugli but
were denied access to any peace camps or rural areas (which they duly noted in
their report). The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Sudan, Gaspar Biro,
also made a visit to Kadugli and filed a similar report. These small efforts
reportedly made some difference: Nuba leaders in Sudan report that the
government became marginally more circumspect.
The international community only became more
than bystanders in 1995, with the African Rights-BBC mission to the Nuba
Mountains, subsequent efforts by NGOs and solidarity groups, the belated
engagement of the UN, and the ceasefire negotiations of January
2002.
Conclusions and Lessons
The phase of jihad ended with the
transfer out of South Kordofan of the key militants and the down-scaling of the
relocations policy in 1993. Although the threat of genocide was then averted,
extremely brutal counter-insurgency continued. Without major attention,
government forces perpetuated a high level of killing, burning, rape and
displacement. The extremists in government had not achieved the goal of rapid
and spectacular ethnic cleansing, but now had a policy that would achieve some
of the same result, albeit more slowly and messily. During this phase the
government subverted some Nuba leaders with a policy dignified with the name of
“peace from within.” This abandoned the more overtly racist aspects of the
jihad in order to make some Nuba leaders accomplices in their own
oppression.
What can we surmise about the conditions that led to genocide being averted
in the Nuba Mountains, and what general lessons do these hold?
The two critical reasons identified are the
incoherence of the genocidal project itself and the capacity of the Nuba people
to resist. The Nuba case demonstrates how difficult it is to carry out
genocide. The Sudanese political and military elites were united around the
demand for fighting the war in a ruthless manner, but not upon population
relocation or genocide. The ideological rationale for the destruction of the
Nuba identity was provided by a particular interpretation of political Islam,
but that interpretation was internally contradictory and lacked the tools
needed to turn an ideal into a reality. And the Islamists’ sheikh,
Hassan al Turabi, flinched.
The incoherence of an ideological project is
not a knock-down argument against its capacity to inflict massive destruction
including genocide. If flawed ideologies fell apart at the first challenge,
there would have been no genocides in Germany or Rwanda. What made it possible
for the Nuba to survive both physically and socio-culturally was their ability
to resist effectively. The successful military defense of the mountains in 1992
was not a foregone conclusion. It was possible because of gifted leadership and
the ability of society to come together at a critical moment and unite in
self-defense. Those of us privileged to see the extraordinary self-confidence
of the Nuba at that moment in their history and for a few years thereafter were
hopeful that this social cohesion could be maintained. We were over-optimistic,
but nonetheless the Nuba were able to find the will when it mattered. Quite
possibly, the very fact that they faced their moment of truth alone and without
external support, contributed to their success. Those who seek salvation from
outside rarely find it.
19 The oldest lesson of humanitarian action
and political emancipation (as well as social and economic development) is
applicable even at the extremity of genocide: do it yourself.
The international community played a minor
role. During the critical period it knew too little and did too little to find
out what was happening. It was handicapped by its own conflicts of interest,
notably the humanitarians’ concern not to compromise relief access in Southern
Sudan and the agenda of the U.S. religious right to demonize not only the Sudan
Government but also Muslims and Arabs in general. But the Sudan Government was
sensitive to international opinion, and ultimately it was this that ameliorated
the vicious counter-insurgency.
Endnotes
1
African Rights, Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan, London, July 1995;
BBC, ‘“Sudan’s Secret War,’” July 1985.
2
Interviewed by the BBC in Switzerland, 13 June 1995.
3
Interviewed by the BBC in Switzerland, 13 June 1995, see Facing
Genocide p. 222.
4
African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of
Humanitarianism, London, 1997, pp 202-3.
5
See Alex de Waal (ed.) Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa,
Indiana, 2004.
6
They included el Tayeb Mohamed Ahmed (known as Tayeb ‘“Sikha’,” the iron bar),
Nafie Ali Nafie, Majzub el Khalifa and Qutbi el Mahdi.
7
Two Iranians were captured and killed by the SPLA, Facing Genocide,
pp. 113-14.
8
Individual operations had names drawn from the early history of Islam,
including Tayir al Ababil (‘“Birds of Ababil,’” from the battle,
mentioned in the Koran, in which Allah sent birds to protect the Kaaba of
Mecca) and Badr el Kubra, from the Prophet Mohamed’s biggest victory
against the unbelievers.
9
Fatwa issued by religious leaders, Imams of mosques and Sufists of
Kordofan State, 27 April 1992.
10
Youssef Bodanski, Bin Laden: The Man who Declared War on America, New
York, Forum, 1999, p. 111.
11
Sahal was a member of the national Legislative Assembly and head of Islamic
Affairs Bureau in Kordofan.
12
Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, Plainfield, IN., American Trust Publications,
1990.
13
A.H. Abdel Salam, ‘“On the failure and persistence of jihad,’” in Alex
de Waal (ed.) Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn, London, C. Hurst,
2004.
14
He was transferred in April 1993.
15
NAFIR ‘“The History of the Battle of Tullishi Mountain,’” NAFIR: The
Newsletter of the Nuba Mountains, Sudan, Nuba Mountains Solidarity Abroad,
3.3, October 1997.
16
Yousif Kuwa Mekki, ‘“Things would no longer be the same,’” in Suleiman Rahhal
(ed.) The Right to be Nuba: The Story of a Sudanese People’s Struggle for
Survival, Trenton NJ, Red Sea Press, 2001.
17
Almost uniquely for a guerrilla force that has routinely executed those
suspected of treachery, he was first imprisoned, then transferred to the South,
and subsequently demobilised and given responsibility for a development
project.
18
Africa Watch, ‘“Sudan: Eradicating the Nuba: Africa Watch Calls for
the United Nations to Investigate Killings, Destruction of Villages and Forced
Removals,’” 9 September 1992.
19
In this regard, it is interesting that the title of the Nuba magazine NAFIR,
drawn from the Arabic nafir meaning a communal self-help party, was
initially (1995) designed with the banner, ‘“Nuba Association for an
International Rescue,’” but changed by the second editor (Suleiman Rahhal) to
read instead ‘“The newsletter of the Nuba Mountains, Sudan.’”